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Security studies scholarship on nuclear weapons is partic-
ularly prone to self-censorship.1 In this essay, I argue that
this self-censorship is problematic. The vulnerability,
secrecy, and limits to accountability created by nuclear
weapons (Deudney 2007, 256–57; Born, Gill, and Ha^nggi
2010; Cohen 2010, 147) call for responsible scholarship
vis-a-vis the general public. This need for renewed and ex-
panded scholarly responsibility is especially pressing given
current plans among nuclear-weapon states to “modern-
ize” their nuclear arsenals, committing their citizens and
children to live in nuclear-armed countries and, a fortiori,
a nuclear armed world (Mecklin 2015). Despite this need,
the existing reflexive literature in security studies—calling
for greater scholarly responsibility (see Steele and Amour-
eux 2016; Waever 2015, 95–100)—has neither specifi-
cally focused on nuclear weapons nor explored the forms
of self-censorship identified here as shaping a modality of
responsibility. In making this case, I define self-censorship
in nuclear weapons scholarship as unnecessary boundaries
on scholarly discourse within security studies.
In this article, I identify three forms of self-censorship:
an epistemological self-censorship that denies the
normative foundations of nuclear studies; a rhetorically
induced form of censorship that leads scholars to stay
away from radical reorderings of the world (e.g., world
government or the abolition of nuclear weapons) because
of the joint rhetorical effects of the tropes of non-
proliferation and deterrence; and, finally, a “presentist
imaginal” form of self-censorship that leads scholars to
obfuscate the implicit bets they make on their considered
possible futures and their constitutive effects on the
“present” they analyze. I do not claim that these are the
only forms of self-censorship. I also leave aside the non-
discursive structures of knowledge production and the in-
stitutional and political constraints on nuclear studies.
However, as I show in the concluding section, these three
forms of self-censorship result in an unduly narrow sense
of scholarly responsibility, which does not meet the
requirements of democratic politics in the age of global
nuclear vulnerability.
One should not expect this problem to be solved by a
disciplinary division of academic labor in which histo-
rians tackle the issue of responsibility while security stud-
ies scholars do not.2 As a result, identifying these forms of
self-censorship allows us to both expand the scope of
responsibility and exercise it as security studies scholars.
In the current configuration, we think of ourselves, at
best, as responsible managers of the nuclear present, a
present expected to be extended into the future. If we
become aware of our self-imposed blinders, we could
conceive ourselves as responsible citizens of a future in
the making.
1 I leave aside studies of nuclear weapons–related issues
that would not self-identify as a subset of security stud-
ies in order to fit the remit of this forum. As a result, Jon-
athan Schell and E. P. Thompson, arguably two of the
most influential nuclear weapons intellectuals who
stretched the boundaries of what was imaginable, re-
main outside the scope of this study. The same is true for
the fissile materials approach to nuclear weapons issues
and the book Unmaking the Bomb, dedicated to the
memory of Jonathan Schell (Feiveson et al. 2014).
2 It is significant that in a 2014 joint effort between H-Diplo,
a journal of diplomatic history, and the international
security section of the International Studies Association
celebrating the “renaissance” of nuclear studies
(McAllister and Labrosse 2014), the notion of responsibil-
ity was barely mentioned, as if the issue was settled.
Even more troubling, when it appears—only four times—
it is in reference to variables and not to scholars and
their mission. The general public as an audience is
absent.
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Epistemological Self-Censorship: Denial of
the Normative Foundations of Nuclear
Studies
Explicitly reflexive security studies scholars have not sus-
tainably addressed nuclear weapons issues in spite of mo-
ments of engagement—that is, the post–Cold War, the
Obama administration following the 2009 Prague speech,
and the humanitarian impact initiative (Booth and Whee-
ler 1992; Burke 2009; Masco 2015; Peoples 2016; Ritchie
2012, 2013; Burke 2016a). As a consequence, Buzan and
Hansen’s (2009, 21) remark that “the majority of writings
in ISS [International Security Studies] do not go to great
length to discuss their analytical, normative, and episte-
mological assumptions” also applies to nuclear studies.
Instead, the field reflects the primacy of a proclaimed
quest for detached knowledge production, seen as a con-
dition of objectivity, which is in turn perceived as a condi-
tion for the production of knowledge recognized as scien-
tific (Douglas 2009, 46–47, 122–23; Oren 2003, 6). This
is true of a majority of the recent English-language schol-
arship on nuclear issues, produced in and outside the
United States.3
In such an epistemological context, it is worth follow-
ing Robert Cox’s (1981, 128) classical advice: “There is
accordingly no such thing as theory in itself, divorced
from a standpoint in time and space. When a theory so
represents itself, it is the more important to examine it as
ideology and to lay bare its concealed perspective.” It is
not hard to find the purpose and normativity of nuclear
studies. The field is fundamentally driven to avoid at least
one form of nuclear war, the one in which no one sur-
vives. The variation is between those who implicitly see
some use for nuclear weapons, up to limited nuclear war,
as acceptable and those who see any nuclear explosion as
unacceptable (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 115).
This perspective was more obvious in the early years
of the nuclear age but became implicit and increasingly
hidden as security studies disciplined itself as part of
“International Relations” with a positivist understanding
of science. For example, early debates about the possibil-
ity and utility of a pre-emptive or preventive war against
the Soviet Union before it acquired nuclear weapons
mostly took place among the RAND Corporation, US Air
Force, and prominent public intellectuals (Goldstein
2006, 38), and was premised on the shared goal of avoid-
ing a worse (nuclear) war (Trachtenberg 1991, 100–
107).4 Those who explicitly advocated for the use (or
threatening advantage) of nuclear weapons wrote/spoke
as if they regarded nuclear war as winnable so long as the
Soviets were unable to retaliate. Those who were ambigu-
ous about which capabilities the United States should use
thought along similar lines as those that advocated for
nuclear war. They either did not treat nuclear weapons as
radically different from any other weapon (Cillessen
1998) or thought that conventional war would “avoid
atomic war,” as Bertrand Russell told the Royal Empire
Society on December 3, 1947 (Perkins 1994, 137).5 One
finds a similar and striking commonalities between pro-
ponents of the manageability of limited nuclear war and
escalation control, like Herman Kahn, and theorists like
John Herz who saw the advent of the thermonuclear rev-
olution as requiring radical change in the political organi-
zation of the world. Kahn clearly stated his purpose in
On Thermonuclear War ([1960] 2010, 7) as “avoiding di-
saster and buying time.” One can at least agree with him
on the fact that “there seems to be some consensus on
what we are trying to avoid even if we cannot agree on
what we are for” (7). Indeed, Herz did not agree with this
managerial approach, but clearly expressed that the ther-
3 While it is true that important reflexive voices, which
think beyond the three modalities of self-censorship de-
fined here and articulate a notion of responsibility, like
Nick Ritchie (2009, 2012, 2013) and Anthony Burke (2009,
2016b) among others, are non-US nationals, this should
not hide the fact that the three features of scholarship
identified in this article can be found in most mainstream
security studies scholarship written in English, even by
non-US scholars. The writings of leading Russian and
Chinese scholars (Arbatov 2012; Bin 2015; Zhang 2016) fit
the three criteria set above, with one nuance to be ex-
plored further below. Quite tellingly, the most recent
scholarship on the rise of a Chinese school of interna-
tional relations does not indicate a significantly different
approach to nuclear weapons issues and the attached
responsibility of scholars (Zhang and Chang 2016).
4 This already touches on the constitutive power of the
imaginary of the future and its potential as source of
self-censorship that I will focus on in the third section.
5 My argument does not apply to the entire US preventive
war planning community. The plans for preventive war
against the Soviet Union (Pincher in 1946, Broiler in 1947,
and Crankshaft in 1948) did not mention a goal of nuclear
war avoidance and unambiguously advocated the pre-
ventive use of nuclear weapons (Rosenberg and Ross
1990). Such planning moved to considerations of a pre-
emptive war but continued at least through the Eisen-
hower and Kennedy administrations (Trachtenberg 1991,
132–46; Burr 2001). Thank you to Matthew Evangelista
for forcing me to clarify this and helping me to do so.
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monuclear revolution asked the scholar to take responsi-
bility and to give up on the idea of disinterested (social)
science. “The ideal of the uncommitted, ivory-tower re-
searcher,” wrote Herz, “had to be substituted by that of
the ‘homme engage´, if not homme re´volte´’”(quoted in
Sylvest and van Munster 2014, 539).6 Overall, the nor-
mative goal of some form of thermonuclear war avoid-
ance explicitly united nuclear weapons scholarship before
the ideal of disinterested scholarship orchestrated its ob-
fuscation.
The imperative of disinterested social science did not
change the shared goal: it just made it implicit or led
scholars to manifest it in less obvious ways. Campbell
Craig’s (2003) analysis of the intellectual itinerary of
Kenneth Waltz, the most influential scholar in post–
World War II international relations (IR) and security
studies, strongly suggests this persisting foundation even
after the rise of supposedly dispassionate and objective
neorealism. Craig (2003) shows that Waltz’s epistemo-
logical as well as theoretical inconsistencies can be ex-
plained by failing efforts to obfuscate and neutralize his
normative goal of thermonuclear war avoidance. Episte-
mologically, he first tried to circumvent the dilemma of
the thermonuclear age in the name of a quest for dispas-
sionate scholarship in Man, the State and War (1959).
Waltz ended up implicitly, but decisively, recognizing his
fundamental normative commitment to great-power
peace and thermonuclear war avoidance in the last chap-
ter of Theory of International Politics (1979). This com-
mitment also led him to a theoretical inconsistency, most
visible in his 1981 essay on “The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons.” In it, Waltz retreats from the primacy of
structural factors as causes of great power peace to em-
phasize the primary importance of nuclear weapons
(Craig 2003, 117–65). Two more recent publications
suggest the continued normative goal of thermonuclear
war avoidance underpinning the writings on this subject:
George Shultz and James Goodby’s (2015) edited book
The War That Must Never Be Fought, and Jeffrey Larsen
and Kerry Kartchner’s (2014) edited volume On Limited
Nuclear War in the 21st Century. By referring to Presi-
dent Gorbachev and President Reagan’s joint 1985 decla-
ration that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never
be fought,” the first book outlines an unconditional im-
perative of nuclear war avoidance (Shultz 2015, xii). The
second book is positioned toward the other end of the
normative spectrum: nuclear war is a possibility, so we
have to reduce its likelihood or reach. However, even
with those assumptions, the imperative of avoidance of
some form of nuclear war remains. In the second book,
contributor Jim Wirtz (2014) is as clear about this as
Shultz is in the first one. He writes, “we especially want
to avoid the occurrence of a desultory nuclear exchange
involving a few score, or a hundred, nuclear detonations”
(Wirtz 2014, 263). Wherever you stand on the debates
about inevitability and acceptability of limited nuclear
war or nuclear weapons use as a scholar, there is a form
of nuclear war that you are writing to prevent. This
unspoken normative goal of thermonuclear war avoid-
ance paves the way to a rhetorical source of self-
censorship that manifests itself most explicitly in the in-
terplay between non-proliferation and deterrence.
Rhetorical Self-Censorship: How the
Interplay of Non-Proliferation and
Deterrence Delegitimizes Transformative
Ideas
(Non-)proliferation and deterrence are central notions in
security studies focused on nuclear weapons. They are
problematic and too often accepted as neutral analytical
categories (Mutimer 2000; Pelopidas 2011). As I will
show in this section, their articulation in the security stud-
ies literature fuels rhetorical self-censorship because it
delegitimizes transformative thinking as unrealistic or
dangerous.
Conceptual innovation in the nuclear conversation
most often occurs within the boundaries set by these two
categories.7 For example, innovations are often about an
adjective or a prefix: the most recent innovations would
be winter-safe, tailored, or cross-domain deterrence; simi-
larly, the 1990s imagined opaque proliferation, then
counter-proliferation. One might argue that the notion of
proliferation is actually in debate. However, the debate
focuses mostly on its consequences instead of questioning
the diagnosis, or the concept itself. Academics who want
to go beyond the debate about the effects of the spread of
nuclear weapons agree that what is happening in the
6 Herz’s statement was typical of the classical realist tradi-
tion, which was fully aware of the impossibility of the dis-
interested scholar. For instance, Morgenthau (1948, 7)
wrote in his classic Politics Among Nations; The Struggle
for Power and Peace, “no study of politics and certainly
no study of international politics in the mid-twentieth
century can be disinterested in the sense that it is able
to . . . pursue knowledge for its own sake.”
7 Once again, there are a few exceptions within security
studies like Itty Abraham’s (2006, 2016) notion of nuclear
ambivalence, and a few fruitful conceptual innovations
outside security studies like Gabrielle Hecht’s (2006) no-
tion of nuclearity.
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world can be defined as proliferation even if definitions
are inconsistent (Knopf 2002; Gavin 2012; Kroenig
2009; Robinson 2015). One could even say that the op-
position to nuclear proliferation was one of the few early
agreements between the otherwise opposed traditions of
peace research and strategic studies (Buzan and Hansen
2009, 115). The concept of deterrence does not have any
rival in the nuclear conversation. It has been under attack
(MccGwire 1985, 2006; Mueller 1988; Ritchie 2009;
Wilson 2008, 2012; Avery 2012) but remains an un-
avoidable category. As Jeff Knopf (2009, 44) explains,
“in a situation in which there is no effective defenses
against ballistic missiles and good reasons to doubt that
either disarmament or a first strike knock-out blow
would be successful, most [US] leaders came to the con-
clusion that deterrence was the only feasible strategic op-
tion.” Most English-language security scholarship has
shared this mindset, debating which capabilities would
best serve this strategy. Deterrence has been a “centrist
compromise” between proponents of a nuclear first strike
and proponents of disarmament (Knopf 2009, 44-46).
The writings of some Chinese security studies scholars
are noteworthy exceptions; they accept the category of
“non-proliferation” but question the utility of deterrence
by noting that threats presented to deter can actually
have a compelling effect (Bin 2015, 358–59). Other Chi-
nese scholars, however, still use the category of “mini-
mum deterrence” (Zhang 2016). In sum, the central
categories of deterrence and non-proliferation are pre-
sented as unavoidable subordinate goals to nuclear war
avoidance.
Speech and writings based on the central concepts of
proliferation and deterrence do double work and, as
such, contribute to rhetorical self-censorship. Both pro-
liferation and deterrence appear as purely descriptive
categories, but they intend to be part of a self-denying
or self-fulfilling prophecy. They describe the world, and
at the same time, they act on it, with a very specific ex-
pected effect. In a context in which the spread of nu-
clear weapons is almost unanimously considered an un-
desirable outcome (contra Gallois 1961; Waltz 1981),
announcing proliferation is a calling for urgent non/
counter-proliferation action. It is a practice intended to
prevent proliferation from happening. As such, the
prophecy of proliferation intends to be self-denying.
Similarly, talking authoritatively in public about the ef-
ficacy of deterrence intends to give credibility to the de-
terrent threat and therefore to strengthen its effect. Say-
ing “deterrence works” is intended to help it work
better. It is meant to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. As a
consequence, for these statements to be able to work
better, and to serve better as instruments of nuclear war
avoidance, their authors have to deny their intention to
produce an effect. They have to appear authoritative as
descriptions (and nothing more) in order to have the in-
tended effect. This is why I claimed at the end of the pre-
vious section that the unspoken normative goal of nu-
clear war avoidance is paving the way for rhetorical
self-censorship under the concepts of non-proliferation
and deterrence. Keeping the normative goals of nuclear
weapons policy unspoken is perceived to be a condition
for achieving them.
This double work of statements based on proliferation
and deterrence opens two avenues for self-censorship.
First, the descriptive ambitions of those statements open
the way to self-censorship to avoid an accusation of being
unrealistic—that is, incompetent, utopian, or naı¨ve. Since
these authoritative statements are presented as objective
descriptions of the nuclear world, contrary statements
could only be derived absent a sense of reality. In a field
in which institutional recognition and specialized knowl-
edge confer an entitlement to deference, such criticism
can be particularly damaging. Second, statements ex-
pressing concerns with non-proliferation and deterrence
can be stigmatized as dangerous. A scholar would be sus-
pected of jeopardizing deterrence and compromising
non-proliferation efforts by questioning their efficacy or
the reality of the diagnoses of proliferation and deter-
rence.
In sum, once (non-)proliferation and deterrence are
both accepted as valid descriptions of the world and desir-
able outcomes, questioning these categories as diagnoses
appears unrealistic; questioning the actual effects of
prophecies appears dangerous. It is true that the commit-
ment to disinterested scholarship explored above makes it
harder, in a scholarly setting, to acknowledge that the
statements based on proliferation and deterrence have in-
tended effects, which in turn limits censorship explicitly
based on the suspicion that questioning non-proliferation
and deterrence policies would be dangerous. At the same
time, this limitation may give more authority to the state-
ments about proliferation and deterrence since, as sug-
gested earlier, denying their intention to produce an effect
is required for those statements to possibly have such an
effect. As a result, lack of realism is a more frequent base
for censorship than suspicions of danger of such state-
ments, but the latter are implicitly empowered by their
inability to be expressed. Overall, both of those catego-
ries assume a world made of nation-states, thermonu-
clear weapons, and no world government. Therefore, in
a scholarly conversation within the boundaries set by
those categories, and as a result of this rhetorically in-
duced censorship, such a world appears as the only con-
ceivable one.
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Imaginative Self-Censorship: Obfuscation
of the Role of Possible Futures
If one adds the requirement for policy recommendations
and predictions among the leading journals in the field of
security studies (Keylor 2015, 12; Walt 2005, 31–34;
Ward 2016, 84–87) to the unspoken normative founda-
tion of nuclear studies and the rhetorical straitjacket of
non-proliferation and deterrence, the scope of possible fu-
tures that nuclear weapons scholars consider becomes a
third potential locus for censorship. Knowledge claims
about the future are constituted from the possibilities of
the present world—a world in which no one has experi-
enced nuclear war or a catastrophic failure of nuclear de-
terrence (Mallard and Lakoff 2011; Connelly et al. 2012).
As a matter of fact, the future is expected to play a role in
the concluding section of policy-relevant scholarship. But
it is not any kind of future; it is a bounded set of possible
futures derived from patterns that a positivist research
program should have identified in the past and that the
scholar is expected to extend into the future (Williams
1993; Berenskoetter 2011, 657–60; Waever 2015, 95).8
The existing presentism in security studies (see Buzan
and Little 2000, 30) invokes modalities of the future that,
in turn, constitute a third form of self-censorship: “imagi-
native self-censorship.” There are instances in which
scholarly conceptions of the future frame how we treat
the world today (Baylis and O’Neill 2000; Masco 2015;
Mueller 2013; Sylvest and van Munster 2014, 2016;
Zwald 2013). Consider, for instance, discussions of a
world government by Craig (2008) and Deudney (2007).
Craig is a useful break from imaginative self-censorship
but, as suggested above, is premised on an explicit recog-
nition of the normative purpose of nuclear scholarship
and a strong critique of the boundaries imposed by the
rhetoric of non-proliferation (Craig 2003, 2008; see also
Craig and Ruzicka 2013). The best studies of the consti-
tutive force of the future remain outside the scope of secu-
rity studies, or do not engage with nuclear weapons re-
lated problems (see Andersson and Rindzeviciute 2015).
The constitutive effect of our imagined future can be
presented as follows: the further you locate the catastro-
phic failure of nuclear deterrence into the future, and the
least destructive you imagine it to be, the easier it is avoid
problematizing the existing combination of nation-states,
thermonuclear weapons, and no world government.
Therefore, to illustrate this claim about the role of imag-
ined nuclear futures in the boundaries of what scholars
can think about in their analyses of the contemporary
world, I use the two above-mentioned features: the ex-
pected chronology of future events and the expected con-
sequences of deterrence failure.
In terms of expected chronology of the future, I con-
sider the four following events: a radical technological
change making nuclear deterrence less problematic; a
non-nuclear-related disaster, the outcome of which
would not be more acceptable than a nuclear weapons di-
saster; the advent of an existential threat against which
the use of nuclear weapons are imagined to be indispens-
able; and a failure of nuclear deterrence with catastrophic
consequences. No one can know whether those events
will unfold or, if so, in what order; it is ultimately specu-
lative, and informed by the ethical and political prefer-
ences, as well as the imagination, of the person who
makes the ordering.
Similarly, since we have no experience of failure of nu-
clear deterrence leading to a nuclear explosion, one can-
not know for sure what the consequences of such an event
would be. We can determine the humanitarian conse-
quences of an explosion from a given device with a given
yield at a specified altitude and under certain wind condi-
tions, but the ultimate assessment of those consequences
depends on speculative bets on escalation, escalation con-
trol, and the resilience of the society that might survive it.
Both the ordering of those types of events and the ex-
pected effects of a catastrophic failure of nuclear deter-
rence are outside the realm of the knowable, but they af-
fect the way we think about the present.
Two expected chronologies of future events facilitate
the acceptance of the status quo: (1) nuclear weapons are
needed, or (2) a large-scale non-nuclear disaster hits be-
fore deterrence fails catastrophically. The first one is
based on the idea that humanity will face an existential
threat against which nuclear weapons are indispensable
before deterrence fails catastrophically. In the existing lit-
erature, this existential threat takes two forms: a large as-
teroid on a collision course with planet Earth, which
could only be destroyed or deflected by the use of nuclear
weapons against it, or an aggressive regime that can only
be deterred by nuclear threats (de Groot 2004, 259;
Colby 2013, 67).9 In sum, claiming that nuclear weapons
8 Jenny Andersson (2015) has shown how the second gen-
eration of “futurists” after World War II around Johan
Galtung called upon human imagination to generate al-
ternative futures and to resist the colonization of the fu-
ture by existing orders via the claims of prediction,
forecasting, and modeling. They would definitely not la-
bel themselves as “security studies” scholars, though,
so I leave them out of this article.
9 For accuracy’s sake, one has to recognize that NASA
has been developing alternatives to asteroid-busting nu-
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are irreplaceable to face a threat that has to be addressed,
and is expected to appear before a catastrophic failure of
nuclear deterrence, would considerably ease the accep-
tance of the nuclear status quo. Similarly, a large-scale,
non-nuclear, extinction-level event that is expected to
happen before a catastrophic failure of nuclear deterrence
will simply make the concern about an unacceptable fail-
ure of nuclear deterrence irrelevant, and the nuclear sta-
tus quo more acceptable.10
The second feature of scholarly imagination of the
future that has an under-recognized impact on nuclear
weapons scholarship has to do with assumptions about
the consequences of a failure of nuclear deterrence in
terms of compared acceptability. The most optimistic of
nuclear optimists may claim that nuclear deterrence
will always fail in ways that do not cause catastrophic
disaster. For instance, an attempted launch, resulting
from an accident or a misperception, which fails due to
a technological problem, is acceptable since there
would be no catastrophic consequences. This is tanta-
mount to endlessly delaying the catastrophic failure of
nuclear deterrence, which in turn makes it more accept-
able to limit the scholarly conversation to possible fu-
tures with nuclear weapons and a plurality of political
entities.
A second position on that scale, which eases the accep-
tance of the nuclear status quo, assumes that nuclear
weapons will be used in a limited but acceptable fashion.
One scenario is the detonation of a small number of nu-
clear weapons, which causes limited damage and does
not lead to nuclear retaliation. For instance, Quester
(2014, 180) argued that the deliberate use of nuclear
weapons in high space for anti-ballistic purposes would
not necessarily result in the death of any human beings.
Anti-submarine warfare is also an example where nuclear
weapons could be used in a limited and acceptable fash-
ion, with arguably little concern over an escalation to nu-
clear war (Quester 2014, 180). However, recent research
on the humanitarian impact of even a small nuclear war
problematizes this viewpoint. Even limited nuclear war
could lead to a “nuclear winter” and widespread famine.
In order to perpetuate the nuclear status quo, the thresh-
old of acceptability of casualties would need to be signifi-
cantly high (Xia et al. 2015).
The conventionalization of nuclear weapons (Jervis
1984, 57) and the potential for ballistic missile defense, as
an alternative to nuclear deterrence, combine the above-
mentioned features of an imagined nuclear future—that
is, the expected chronology of future events and the ex-
pected consequences of the failure of nuclear deterrence.
According to these features, the nuclear status quo is less
problematic because technological change will reduce the
consequences of a catastrophic failure of deterrence before
it happens, and might even postpone it. Conventionaliza-
tion reduces the effects of a deterrence failure, and a
ballistic missile defense is expected to do so too. If a mis-
sile defense system intercepts all the warheads launched as
a result of a deterrence failure, it would not only reduce
the effects of a deterrence failure, but it would also post-
pone the potential for a catastrophy.
Both the chronology of future events and the expected
consequences of catastrophic failure of nuclear weapons
are beyond the realm of the knowable and affect the way
scholars conceive present challenges, where nation-states,
thermonuclear weapons, and no world government act as
implicit boundaries of an imagined nuclear future. As
such, they operate as implicit blinders and instruments of
self-censorship.
Conclusion: Countering Self-Censorship
and Broadening Scholarly Responsibility
In the age of global nuclear vulnerability, the technicality,
secrecy, and limited accountability that surround nuclear
weapons systems demand a better understanding of the
responsibility of security studies scholars in democratic
societies, as individual intellectuals and as a community.
In this context, self-censorship matters because of the lim-
itations it imposes on the way scholars implicitly or ex-
plicitly think about their responsibility.
The three modalities of self-censorship identified above
unduly narrow the definition of scholarly responsibility.
If scholarship has to appear non-normative, to engage
with nuclear weapons politics only in terms of deterrence
and non-proliferation, and does not have to recognize the
limiting effects of its imagined futures on the way it en-
gages with the present, the notion of responsibility that
follows from it is skewed toward accepting thermonuclear
weapons, separate nation-states, and no world govern-
ment. Since such a world appears as the only possible and
acceptable one, all we can and need to do is manage it. In
such an arrangement, scholars are primarily responsible
clear weapons (Adams et al. 2007). Thanks to Daniel
Deudney for pointing me to this article.
10 One should note that it does not follow from this bet on
the timing of disaster that one should accept the perpet-
uation of a nuclear status quo, simply that it would be
easier. Acceptance does not follow because one might
engage in a struggle for change in nuclear weapons pol-
icy while addressing the disaster expected to take place
earlier, and other critiques in terms of legality, morality,
and cost of nuclear weapons are not affected by this bet.
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vis-a-vis managers of the nuclear present, a present ex-
pected to be extended into the future.11
If those boundaries became part of the conversa-
tion, scholars would become responsible vis-a-vis citi-
zens of a future in the making that has already started.
This future involves everyone on this planet since nu-
clear war is an act of omnicide—potentially removing
any trace of human existence. If scholars targeted
these loci of self-censorship, they would not only im-
mediately broaden the scope of their responsibilities,
but they would also redefine them. If scholars were
explicit about their normative commitment to some
form of nuclear war avoidance, they would start being
more critical about the boundaries of the futures they
allow themselves to imagine. Nuclear managerialism
becomes problematic once the following becomes
clear: (1) the commitments to some form of nuclear
war avoidance, (2) the censoring effects of the catego-
ries of non-proliferation and deterrence, and (3) the
implicit assumptions made about the future that result
in the illusion of postponing and containing nuclear
disaster. It loses its obvious, inevitable, and seemingly
apolitical character. Scholars would then have to re-
think the trade-offs they make when they accept such
boundaries and to imagine alternatives. The many
scholars who have adopted this reflexive attitude tend
to neglect the problems of nuclear weapons and
should re-engage.
As suggested in the last section, the coexistence of
faith in endlessly avoiding thermonuclear war with the
continued practice of managerialism is premised either on
the idea that extinction will take place before a nuclear
weapons disaster or on one of the following forms of
technological utopia: (1) the conventionalization of nu-
clear explosives that makes their use acceptable in a way
that does not trigger escalation; (2) a technological fix for
the condition of nuclear vulnerability (e.g., the shield the
US Missile Defense Agency has been developing over the
past five decades at a cost of billions of dollars); and (3)
the faith that human misperceptions or errors will be
compensated by providential technological failure, lead-
ing only to the desirable outcome of no nuclear explosion.
This is where the normative imperative of nuclear war
avoidance meets a democratic imperative of unearthing
the implicit assumptions of managerialism and opening
up possible futures beyond non-proliferation and deter-
rence. Policymaking elites and the general public would
then gain a broader set of choices than continuing to ex-
plicitly or tacitly support policies that overstate their abil-
ities to avoid future nuclear weapons use. The point is not
to reject the possibility of speaking to the elites, but rather
to emphasize the need to inform citizens and, if one
speaks to elites, to do so beyond their stated needs and
their terms of the debate (Neumann 2008; Pelopidas
2014).
Of course, a political community can choose to wait
for an early non-nuclear disaster or a technological solu-
tion; it can even choose to wait for nuclear extinction or
hope it will never happen. A strong commitment to de-
mocracy does not allow the scholar, the expert, or the
public intellectual to negate those choices or delegitimize
them, provided that they are based on an informed de-
bate. Such a debate would note the cases in which hu-
mankind avoided nuclear disasters out of luck (Lewis
et al. 2014; Pelopidas 2015, 14–17), the organizational
features of nuclear weapons that make such complex and
tightly coupled systems bound to fail in the long run (Per-
row 1999; Sagan 1993, 2004), and the fallibility of the
theories, judgments, and assumptions of engineers
building those weapons (Downer 2011). It would also
mobilize the largely forgotten categories of non-offensive
defense, cooperative security, and other alternatives to
non-proliferation and deterrence that do not require a
world government. However, if one chooses to bet nei-
ther on technology nor on the conventionalization of
nuclear weapons, nor to wait for extinction with the
“hope” that it will predate a large-scale nuclear disaster,
scholarship has to give them a way of engaging with the
coexistence of nation-states, nuclear vulnerability, and a
managerial approach.12
My claims are based on an imperative of imagination
that I call the “utopian imperative.” Indeed, the practice
of utopia as a method and imaginative process (Levitas
2013), and the encouragement to spread such a practice,
can “fulfill an important function in IR theory through
the imagination of alternate ‘better’ worlds, however so
conceived” (Brincat 2009, 582). This should be the case
even if “IR theory remains reticent to re-evaluate utopi-
anism based on its earlier rejection of the tradition by
classical realism” (Brincat 2009, 604). The argument is
not that moving away from self-censorship is moving
away from realism and toward utopia. Instead, it is that
while non-managerial change is often portrayed as uto-
11 This is one of the core problems of this mainly American
scholarship that tends to define policy relevance as rel-
evance to the US policymaking elites of the day on their
own terms (Pelopidas 2014; Waever 2015, 91, 94–96).
12 In that respect, the responsibility of a nuclear scholar
does not depend on their actual capacity to produce
policy change.
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pian, continued reliance on the nuclear status quo is pre-
mised on bets on the future, which are equally utopian,
even if these utopias are more dependent on technological
changes (Pelopidas 2015, 5–8).13 In that respect, utopia,
as a method and an imperative, should be accepted as
counter to self-censorship, as a contribution to knowl-
edge in nuclear studies, and as a much-needed way of
broadening the responsibility of scholars in democratic
societies under the nuclear shadow.14
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